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  Those characteristics have not been lacking in American diplomacy. U.S. statesmen have almost always led the efforts to create an idealistic perfect peace. It started with Woodrow Wilson’s campaign to make World War I “a war to end all wars” through the creation of the League of Nations. It continued in the late 1920s when U.S. diplomats drafted the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war. It persisted with Franklin Roosevelt’s trust in the ability of the United Nations to restrain aggressors. Even today many Americans cling to the belief that the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union would evaporate if the leaders of the two countries would just sit down at the negotiating table, “get to know each other,” and hammer out their differences.

  We will never have real peace unless Americans shed their idealistic delusions. Conflict is the natural state of affairs in the world. Nations are bound to come into conflict over a variety of issues and through a variety of means, and the danger will always exist that those conflicts will lead to violence. Our task is not to try to eliminate all conflict—which is impossible—but to manage conflict so that it does not break out into war.

  We are not helpless in a chaotic world. We have the necessary tools to build real peace. Those who might initiate aggression will do so only if they believe they will profit from it. No state will go to war unless its leaders believe they can achieve their goals at an acceptable cost. We can affect that calculus of costs and benefits by ensuring that no potential aggressor can conclude that aggression pays. Our goal must be to take the profit out of war.

  There is a double lock on the door to peace. The Soviet Union and the United States both hold a key. We cannot achieve real peace without at least the tacit cooperation of Mikhail Gorbachev.

  I have met with three of the principal postwar leaders of the Soviet Union—Nikita Khrushchev in 1959 and 1960, Leonid Brezhnev in 1972, 1973, and 1974, and Gorbachev in 1986. Gorbachev is by far the ablest of the three. In just two years, he has become an international superstar. At age fifty-five, much younger than his immediate predecessors, he can expect to rule the Soviet Union for over a generation, facing as many as five U.S. Presidents. That makes him a far more formidable adversary. But it also opens up greater possibilities for real peace.

  Many Western reporters and diplomats have tripped over themselves in gushing over Gorbachev. But, like self-proclaimed Soviet experts in the past, they have generally been totally obsessed with style. After meeting Joseph Stalin, an American diplomat commented, “His brown eyes are exceedingly wise and gentle. A child would like to sit on his lap, and a dog would sidle up to him.” When Khrushchev rose to power, some pundits wrote him off as a buffoon because he wore ill-fitting clothes, was poorly educated, spoke bad Russian, drank too much, and had crude manners. Brezhnev received higher marks—he wore silk shirts with French cuffs—but was ridiculed for his earthiness and his awkward public manner. Newspapers across the ideological spectrum from the Washington Post to the Wall Street Journal had feature stories on the fact that Yuri Andropov played tennis and liked American jazz, Scotch whisky, and abstract art.

  Gorbachev’s neatly tailored suits, refined manners, beautiful wife, and smooth touch with reporters have made him a star with the press and the diplomatic corps. An American official who met him was impressed by the startling fact that he had “good eye contact, a firm handshake and a deep, melodious voice.” A British politician even remarked that Gorbachev was the man he most admired in the world. A disarmament activist took this a step further, saying, “Gorbachev is like Jesus. He just keeps giving out good things like arms control proposals and getting nothing but rejections.”

  All of that is fatuous nonsense. Stalin’s “gentle” eyes belied his brutal mind. Khrushchev’s peasant manners did not stop him from building the Berlin Wall, and Brezhnev’s clumsy speech did not prevent him from undertaking the greatest military buildup in world history. Andropov’s “with it” style could not conceal the fact that he had been the ruthless head of the world’s most repressive police force. Whoever reaches the pinnacle of power in the Kremlin has learned his politics in the toughest school in the world. If we accept the views of Gorbachev propounded by the antinuclear left, we would be leaving ourselves psychologically disarmed before the man who controls the most powerful armed forces in the world.

  I have met fifteen leaders of communist countries over the past forty years; I have never met a weak one. While we must note the weaknesses of communist governments in terms of their popular appeal, we must not overlook their strengths. Only the strong claw their way to the top in the brutal struggle for power in communist countries. Like other communist leaders, Gorbachev will be determined, ruthless, and skilled at exploiting not only his own strengths but also his adversary’s weaknesses.

  We have and always will have profound differences with Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders. One reason is that we believe in our system and the Soviets reject it. That is easy for most Americans to grasp. But some Americans have more difficulty with the other side of the coin, which is that the Soviets believe in their system and believe it is superior to ours. No matter how critical we are of the Soviets and their actions in the world, we should never be contemptuous of them. We must respect the Soviet Union as a strong and worthy adversary. Respect is important between friends; it is indispensable between potential enemies in the nuclear age.

  Soviet leaders are particularly sensitive about their right to be treated as equals. As Russians, Gorbachev and his colleagues are proud of their history and their culture—their literature, their music, their theater. The homes of Tolstoy and Tchaikovsky are national shrines. They are proud of the strength of the Russian people. They often refer to the fact that the Russians defeated Napoleon in the nineteenth century and Hitler in the twentieth and that Russian casualties in World War II were greater than those suffered by the United States, Britain, and France combined.

  As Harold Macmillan told me before I went to Moscow in 1959, the Soviets have an overwhelming desire to be treated as “members of the club.” They may still feel psychologically inferior, but there is no arguing that in the three decades since then the Soviets have earned the right to be called a superpower. Gorbachev pointedly observed in his press conference after meeting with President Reagan in Geneva, “We are not simpletons.” We cannot quarrel with that statement. Our technology is more advanced than theirs, but what we do they can do. The first man in space was a Russian, not an American. Whether it was the atom bomb, the H-bomb, or the MIR Ving of missiles, they caught up with us and not just because their spies stole our secrets.

  Gorbachev himself, more than his predecessors, is a powerful reminder that we underestimate the Soviets at our peril. He is the antithesis of the common perception of a bearded Bolshevik who wants to blow up the world. He is a highly intelligent, sophisticated man of the world. He exudes charisma, a quality everyone recognizes but no one can describe. He is a great communicator. He earned a bachelor’s degree in law; he was born with a master’s degree in public relations. If he had been born in the United States, he would be a surefire winner as a candidate for public office.

  Gorbachev has supreme self-confidence, iron self-control, and a healthy degree of self-esteem. He is not as quick as Khrushchev, but he is therefore not as prone to mistakes. He thinks before he speaks. He is an homme sérieux, in both the literal and broader senses. He is good at small talk but prefers to get on with the business at hand. Like most extremists on the right as well as the left, he seldom indulges in humor. He prefers to concentrate on the serious issues he has prepared so well to discuss. Some say he has a quick temper. I disagree. He uses his temper; he does not lose it. On the rare occasions he does lose it, he quickly snatches it back and puts it in the service of his relentless drive for domination of the dialogue. He may digress from time to time, but only for the purpose of making his point. He never loses his train of thought. He has an exquisitely disciplined mind.

  When he applied his public-relations talents at
the superpower summit in December 1987, the city of Washington lost its collective senses. He had conservative senators eating out of his hand. He dazzled and charmed the Washington social set. The usually aggressive star reporters of American adversary journalism became pussycats in his presence. Business leaders and media moguls, when they met him in a private audience, did not question some of his obviously outlandish statements. He completely captivated a group of self-styled intellectuals. According to one observer, they served up softball questions that allowed him to hit a home run with each of his answers. No democratic leader—not Churchill, not de Gaulle, not Adenauer—ever enjoyed the kind of fawning, sycophantic treatment Gorbachev did.

  Within establishment circles in Washington, the style of a leader means more than the substance of the policies. But what is important is that more than style distinguishes Gorbachev from his predecessors.

  He is the first top Soviet leader I have met who is a hands-on leader in foreign affairs. He understands the intricate details of East–West issues. Khrushchev fulminated about the rightness of Soviet policies but never stepped beyond the most recent Soviet propaganda line. Brezhnev read prepared statements and then deferred all discussion to his subordinates. When I saw him Gorbachev alone spoke for the Soviet side, without notes, and he exhibited a thorough understanding of all the intricacies of arms control and other issues. He understands power and knows how to use it. He is tenacious but not inflexible. He is the kind of leader who can exercise judgment independent of his advisers and who can strike a deal.

  Gorbachev is a new kind of Soviet leader. Khrushchev tried to cover up Soviet weaknesses by bragging outrageously about Soviet superiority. Brezhnev knew that his nuclear forces were equal to ours, but he still talked defensively by constantly insisting that the Soviet Union and the United States were equals as world powers. Gorbachev is so confident of his strengths that he is not afraid to talk about his weaknesses.

  His recognition of Soviet weaknesses does not mean he has lost faith in the Soviet system. It is as useless to try to convert the Soviets to our way of thinking as it is for them to try to convert us to theirs. Whenever we try to debate ideology with them it is like two ships passing in the night. Human rights are a case in point. The Soviets consider the major human rights to be free health care, free housing, free education, and full employment. We consider the major human rights to be freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and free elections.

  We believe we are on the right side of history. They believe they are. Therefore, as a start in developing a new live-and-let-live relationship, both superpowers should accept how and why they are different, learn to respect each other’s strength and abilities, and avoid rhetoric which gratuitously puts the other down, while recognizing that we will both remain forceful advocates of our own beliefs.

  Like his predecessors, Gorbachev seeks to expand the influence and power of the Soviet Union. Regardless of the refinements he has introduced into Moscow’s public-relations techniques, he has preserved the long-term objective of pushing for global predominance. But he is the first Soviet leader who has faced up to the fact that the Soviet Union suffers from fundamental internal problems that threaten its status as a superpower. He is a dedicated communist. But when he looks at the Soviet position in the world, he wears no ideological blinkers.

  As he looks back over the twentieth century, he sees an impressive historical record for communism. Lenin was the leader of only a small band of conspirators at the turn of the century. Until World War II, only one country with only 7 percent of the world’s population had a communist government. Now two of the greatest powers in history, the Soviet Union and China, and over a third of the world’s population live under communist rule.

  Gorbachev knows that the country he rules has tremendous potential. While the United States—including Hawaii—covers six time zones, the Soviet Union covers eleven. Its vast natural resources match its expanse. It has a highly literate, well-educated population. Its peoples have produced great literature and art. Its scientists have made great contributions to man’s knowledge. It has more graduate engineers today than the United States. While its standard of living lags behind that of the West, we should never assume that the Soviet Union is simply a Third World state with nuclear-tipped rockets.

  He also knows that in the last fifteen years the Soviet Union has made significant gains. Moscow has increased its great superiority in conventional military power. It has expanded its coastal navies into a blue-water navy—the largest in the world in terms of tonnage. Most disturbing, it has acquired decisive superiority in the most powerful and accurate nuclear weapons, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. It has projected its power into Southwest Asia, and its proxies have tallied up victories in Southeast Asia, southern Africa, and Central America. Its sustained political and propaganda offensive in Western Europe has prompted major political parties to adopt essentially neutralist platforms, which, if implemented, would lead to the dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance.

  In his lifetime Gorbachev has seen the Soviet Union rise from the status of one of many major powers to that of one of two superpowers. Whatever its other weaknesses, communism has proven to be an effective means for winning and keeping power. That experience serves to confirm Gorbachev’s ideological beliefs. While he knows that the Soviet Union must address great problems, he still believes it represents the wave of the future.

  Gorbachev wants to keep what he has inherited from his predecessors. He also wants to add to the gains if possible. But as he surveys the international scene, he cannot be encouraged. Formidable external and internal obstacles lie in his path.

  As he looks to the west, he sees signs of political unrest in virtually every country of the Soviet bloc, from Poland through Bulgaria. With these uncertain allies at its side, the Soviet Union confronts an alliance that has lasted longer than any other in history. NATO, after a decade of increased defense spending, has significantly strengthened its forces in the field. While the Soviet Union has undermined the international resolve of the Labour Party in Britain and the Social Democratic Party in West Germany, their drift toward neutralism has in turn undercut their electoral appeal. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has been reelected to another five-year term. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher routed her divided opposition at the polls. Under President François Mitterrand and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, France has bolstered its military forces and increased its cooperation with NATO.

  As Gorbachev looks to the east, he sees the enormous long-term challenge posed by China and Japan. China, still a potential enemy, does not represent a military threat to the Soviet Union today, but its huge population and enormous natural resources create an awesome danger for the future. Beijing’s economic reforms compound the threat. If the Soviet Union’s growth rate continues to lag behind China’s as much as it has over the last five years, China will surpass the Soviet Union in terms of gross national product by the middle of the next century.

  Japan, with no energy resources and with less than one-half the population and one-sixtieth the territory of the Soviet Union, has a per-capita income more than twice as high. With its growth far outpacing Moscow’s, Japan will leave the Soviet Union hopelessly behind in the next century. More ominous from the Kremlin’s point of view, the Japanese government has recently rescinded the formal limitation keeping defense spending under one percent of GNP and has undertaken a significant, though still modest, program to upgrade its defenses.

  Like all Soviet leaders, Gorbachev approaches foreign policy with the long term in mind. Americans think in terms of decades. The Soviets think in terms of centuries. He knows the Soviet Union cannot ignore these ominous trends in the Far East. For Moscow, threats in the future are problems in the present.

  As he looks to the south, the threat is already at hand: The Soviet Union is mired in a war in Afghanistan with no prospect for a quick victory. Eight years after the invasion, the Kremlin
still cannot pull out its 120,000 troops without precipitating a collapse of the communist government in Kabul. More than 25,000 Soviet troops have been killed in action. Over $40 billion has been spent on the war, and expenses are running at over $10 billion annually. Its forces have ravaged the countryside, yet Moscow controls little more than the country’s major cities and the main roads. What’s worse, the war carries the risk for ominous political repercussions among the Soviet Union’s Muslim peoples.

  No one should doubt that Moscow has the potential power to prevail. But at the current rate victory will not come for at least twenty years, and it may never come. For the Kremlin leaders, there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

  When Gorbachev looks beyond the regions on his immediate frontiers, he finds all his communist clients in the Third World queuing up for handouts. They are not allies but dependencies. Not one of Moscow’s friends in the Third World could survive without massive economic subsidies or military assistance. Lenin wrote that capitalist countries turned to imperialism as a profit-making venture. If that was true, the communist revolution in Russia certainly did usher in a new era, since Moscow’s empire impoverishes rather than enriches the Kremlin. Vietnam costs the Soviet Union over $3.5 billion a year, Cuba over $4.9 billion, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia a total of over $3 billion, and Nicaragua over $1 billion. Moscow’s imperial domain costs the Kremlin over $35 million a day.

  When Gorbachev looks at the battle of ideas, he sees that the communist ideology has lost its appeal. After a visit to the Soviet Union seventy years ago, a liberal newspaper reporter, Lincoln Steffens, wrote: “I have seen the future and it works.” Now we have all seen that future and it does not work. This is true not only in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, where the people have lived under communism in practice, but also in the rest of the world. In the 1950s, many noncommunists in the Third World admired the Soviet model of economic development. Today, no Third World government aspires to become a bureaucratic nightmare like the Soviet Union, with its jungles of red tape and its stagnant swamp of an economy. In the 1930s, Americans who spied for Moscow acted out of ideological conviction. Today, Americans who have been convicted of spying for the Soviets did it for cold, hard cash.